Seminario / Mintegia 13th December
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Seminar / Mintegia / Seminario
Climate policy negotiations with incomplete information
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Lecturer: Professor Kai A. Konrad
Managing Director at the MaxPlanck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance ( Munich)
Abstract of the Seminar
We analyze bargaining over international climate agreements in a setting with incomplete information about abatement costs. Incomplete information is known as one of the key reasons why negotiations may fail more generally, and why efficiency gains cannot be exploited. We ask whether unilateral commitment to high abatement reduces or increases the likelihood for an efficient negotiation outcome. We find that such commitment behavior reduces the gains from global cooperation, and that, in turn, this reduces the probability of reaching efficient international environmental agreements.
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Referenced Working Paper
"Climate policy negotiations with incomplete information"
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance Working Paper 2011 – 19 (December 2011)
Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance; Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
Download referenced in pdf
The Department of Public Economics at the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance studies
The Department of Public Economics at the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance studies the functioning of government, challenges, and opportunities for reform. As a scientific discipline, modern public economics has several roots. Historically, it has a starting point in cameralism, which dealt with the functioning of state administration, with the establishment and monitoring of public budgets, and with the planning and execution of public projects. Modern public economics applies concepts and methods of economic theory, econometrics and experimental economics, especially in the analysis of incentives in the relationship between private economic agents and the government. Important examples are taxation and social insurance. Public economics has received major impulses from the public choice school, which applies the economic principle of self-interest of agents in the public sector, analyzing the consequences of this principle for the functioning of public administration and the political decision making process. Another important basis of modern public economics is political theory, in particular the theory of the political decision-making processes.
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If you are interested in attending the Seminar, please register yourself clicking
here
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13th of december, 13:00-14:00, Faculty of Sarriko, Room B.01
* The Seminar will be in English. / Mintegia ingelesez burutuko da. / El seminario se realizará en inglés.
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